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MIMO-OFDM Based Energy Harvesting Cooperative
Communications Using Coalitional Game Algorithm
Ahmed Bannour, Claudio Sacchi, Senior Member, IEEE, and Yichuang Sun, Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract—In this paper, we consider the problem of
cooperative communication between relays and base
station in an advanced MIMO-OFDM framework, un-
der the assumption that the relays are supplied by
electric power drawn from energy harvesting (EH)
sources. In particular, we focus on the relay selection,
with the goal to guarantee the required performance
in terms of capacity. In order to maximize the data
throughput under the EH constraint, we model the
transmission scheme as a non-transferable coalition for-
mation game, with characteristic function based on an
approximated capacity expression. Then, we introduce
a powerful mathematical tool inherent to coalitional
game theory, namely: the Shapley value (Sv) to provide
a reliable solution concept to the game. The selected
relays will form a virtual dynamically-configuredMIMO
network that is able to transmit data to destination
using eﬃcient space-time coding techniques. Numer-
ical results, obtained by simulating the EH-powered
cooperativeMIMO-OFDM transmission with Algebraic
Space-Time Coding (ASTC), prove that the proposed
coalitional game-based relay selection allows to achieve
performance very close to that obtained by the same
system operated by guaranteed power supply. The
proposed methodology is finally compared with some
recent related state-of-the-art techniques showing clear
advantages in terms of link performance and goodput.
Index Terms—MIMO, OFDM, Cooperative Communi-
cations, Energy Harvesting, Game Theory.
I. Introduction
As stated in [1], Energy Harvesting (EH) could represent
an interesting and innovative approach to build long-term
and self-sustainable wireless networks, such as wireless
sensor networks (WSNs) in remote human-unfriendly envi-
ronments, mobile network infrastructures deployed in areas
not reached by stable power sources (this is of particular
interest in the framework of the reduction of the Digital
Divide in developing countries) and, last but not the least,
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environmental-friendly networking installations, capable of
saving carbon-based power through the exploitation of
renewable sources.
In Fig. 1, the Bits-per-Joule energy eﬃciency vs. trans-
mit rate is shown for the case of bursty data transmission,
given a constant power supply. As demonstrated in [2],
this curve is typically quasi-concave. Therefore, the data
rate (expressed in b/s/Hz) that maximizes the number of
bits to be transmitted using a Joule of energy, denoted
by ree, can be eﬃciently obtained by a simple bi-sectional
search [1]. Similar considerations can be done also for
the EH case. The key diﬀerence is that, in presence of
EH, the transmission rate depends also on the availability
of the energy harvested from external unstable sources.
When the energy source is stable, the transmission system
switches from “oﬀ” to “on” status (and vice-versa) simply
on the basis of the energy eﬃciency requirements and the
optimum data rate ree is computed. When the energy is
harvested from unstable sources, the switching is activated
by specific events related to the harvesting [1]. In such a
framework, QoS optimization should satisfy some specific
energy eﬃciency constraints involved not only by the nat-
ural necessity of saving power but also by the randomness
of the harvesting process [1], [3], [4].
ree
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Figure 1. Bits-per-Joule energy eﬃciency versus transmission rate r
in the case of stable power supply [1].
In this paper, we face the problem of QoS provisioning
in a cooperative MIMO-OFDM transmission system based
on small self-sustainable relay nodes, powered by energy
harvesting. MIMO-OFDM provides a powerful, integrated
signal-processing tool, capable of exploiting diversity in
diﬀerent domains: space, time and frequency, with aug-
mented eﬃciency and flexibility [5], [6]. Recent trends
of LTE-A design are considering short-range low-power
and low-cost base stations to provide ubiquitous services
[7]. In a recent paper, Zaidi et. al [8] investigated the
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performance of a metro-cellular network made of small
cells empowered by solar energy harvesting. Our work that
considers the cooperation of energy-harvesting powered
relay nodes perfectly fits with the aforesaid topics.
The proposed solution is based on a coalitional game
approach [9]. In particular, the cooperative MIMO-OFDM
network with energy harvesting at relay nodes is modeled
as a Class II non-transferable utility coalition formation
game with characteristic function based on an approxi-
mated capacity expression and Shapley value (Sv) solu-
tion concept. The players of the game are actually the
relay nodes and their related radio resources (i.e. OFDM
subcarriers). They decide to be part of the coalition and,
therefore, to cooperate with the base station on the basis
of the actual level of harvested energy. The virtual MIMO
network that transmit information to the destination nodes
is then configured at each epoch by the relays that belong
to the coalition. A robust space-time encoder based on Al-
gebraic Space-Time Coding (ASTC) has been introduced
in order to improve the link performance of the cooperative
MIMO transmission. The proposed coalitional game-based
approach is characterized by computational sustainability,
eﬃciency and flexibility and outperforms the related state-
of-the-art solutions in terms of achievable goodput and
energy eﬃciency, yielding to performance very close to that
obtained with guaranteed power supply.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section II
will discuss the novel contribution of the present work as
compared to the state-of-the-art background. Section III
describes the MIMO-OFDM relay system and discusses
EH strategy and power consumption model. Coalitional
game formulation and Shapley value expression are shown
in Section IV. Simulation results, comparison with related
state-of-the-art techniques and computational complexity
are discussed in Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn
in Section VI.
Notice: in the following, symbols (.)†, (.)H , ∥.∥ and
(.)∗ stand for the pseudo inverse, Hermitian transpose,
Frobenius norm of a matrix, and conjugate, respectively.
II. Background and Innovation
A. State-of-the-art review
MIMO-OFDM techniques are robust and spectrally eﬃ-
cient. However, it is not clear whether they are also energy-
eﬃcient [10]. MIMO can support higher data rates under
the same power budget than Single-Input Single-Output
(SISO) systems, but it consumes more circuit power as
multiple RF stages are jointly operated. Moreover, in
MIMO-OFDM systems, space-time coding and other base-
band processing tasks are carried out at subcarrier level
and thus the circuit power consumption increases with the
number of subcarriers. Long-range communication systems
powered by stable energy sources typically target the
minimization of the RF transmitted power only. But, when
short range applications are considered, using wireless
sensors or, as in our case, small relay nodes powered by
unstable energy sources, the circuit energy consumption
may become a serious issue [11]. An added challenge in
the above considerations is that mobile terminals and
base stations do not have access to perfect channel state
information (CSI). Imperfect CSI knowledge may severely
impair power and rate allocation to subcarriers. Indeed
stochastic fluctuations of CSI and observation noise make
optimization techniques that rely on a greedy “one-oﬀ”
calculation of optimal transmit characteristics (such as
waterfilling) to fail in providing optimal radio resource
distribution, with a consequential waste of power and
bandwidth [12].
Cooperative MIMO techniques and relaying are regarded
by the current literature as viable solutions to the critical
tradeoﬀ between energy eﬃciency and quality-of-service in
mobile communication systems operated by non-durable
and/or unstable power sources. In [13], the selection of
the best transmitter subset minimizing power consumption
in cooperative MIMO WSNs is implemented, consider-
ing diﬀerent network configurations (intracluster node-to-
node multihop and cluster-to-cluster multihop) and using
diﬀerent algorithms (maximum spanning tree searching
and singular-value decomposition). Another paper facing
the issues of energy eﬃciency in WSNs is [14], where
data aggregation and cooperative MIMO techniques are
adopted in order to control the energy consumption per
bit. In [15], the tradeoﬀ between energy and information
transfer in a relay-based MIMO-OFDM two-hop wireless
network with energy harvesting is investigated. Joint opti-
mal source and relay frequency precoders are designed to
eﬃciently balance the above mentioned tradeoﬀ. In [16],
authors investigated how the QoS requirements can be
guaranteed in RF energy-harvested cognitive OFDM relay
systems. Eﬃcient strategies for power splitting and radio
resource allocation have been proposed in [16] to satisfy
the QoS requirements in the presence of limited energy
and spectrum shortage. The simultaneous wireless infor-
mation and energy transfer for non-regenerative MIMO-
OFDM relaying systems has been considered in [17]. In
this work, two relaying protocols have been proposed,
namely: Time Switching-based Relaying (TSR) and Power-
Splitting-based Relaying (PSR) with optimization of end-
to-end information rate for both, under the assumption
of ideal CSI knowledge. The optimal broadcast scheduling
for energy-harvesting powered transmitter with non-ideal
circuit power consumption has been dealt in [18]; in par-
ticular low complexity policies to maximize the weighted
sum-throughput for MIMO broadcast channels have been
formally derived. In [19], the authors proposed an optimal
resource allocation strategy for MIMO relay system with
energy harvesting in simultaneous wireless information and
energy transfer networks. Closed-form solutions for time
and power allocation have been derived and tested in [19].
In some recent works, theoretical game-based approaches
have been considered to face the problem of QoS provi-
sioning in cooperative relaying systems with energy har-
vesting. Game theory [20] provides a highly sophisticate
mathematical tool, which has been widely used in many
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fields of economics, social science, physical sciences and
engineering to solve NP-complete optimization problems
with aﬀordable computational complexity. Several game
models have been proposed, which are classified into non-
cooperative and cooperative. Non-cooperative game theory
models the actions of agents maximizing their utility in
a defined procedure, relaying on a detailed description
of the moves and information available to each agent
[21]. Cooperative game theory models how agents compete
and cooperate as coalitions in unstructured interactions
to create and capture value. For this reason, cooperative
games are called coalitional, while non cooperative games
are called procedural [21].
Cooperative game theory analyses situations where
agents can cooperate to create value by joining coali-
tions, but also where agents compete to capture value
[21]. Its formalism considers a set of agents and a func-
tion that returns the values that each subset of agents
called coalition can create (characteristic function). The
characteristic function is actually the input to a solution
concept, which returns the value captured by each agent,
called imputation. In cooperative games, the bargaining
procedure is not structured like in the non-cooperative
counterpart; therefore, the solution concept simply models
the negotiations occurring among the agents, accounting
for the value created by each coalition [21]. The best
known solution concept of cooperative games is the core
[9] [21]. The core is a set of imputations under which no
coalition has a value greater than the sum of its member
payoﬀs. The core is not the only possible solution concept
of a coalitional game. Other solution concepts are indeed
available [9] [21].
Although coalitional games play an important role in
economics and political science, they are less popular in the
wireless world. When a common resource must be shared
among several agents, which is the case with wireless
medium, mobile devices and relay nodes, coalitional game
solutions can prove their robustness.
The state-of-the art framework related to theoretical
game-based capacity optimization of cooperative networks
with energy harvesting contains some recent papers that
deserve citation. Stupia et. al. proposed in [22] a non-
cooperative bargaining game to optimize the goodput of
OFDM-based relaying networks with energy harvesting.
Repeated non-cooperative Bayesian Stackelberg game has
been employed in [23] for relay selection in EH relay
networks. Stackelberg game is also used in [24] to manage
the exchange of transmitted data and harvested energy
in two-hop wireless networks where the base stations are
able to wirelessly power the relays. In [24], the Stackelberg
competition is managed in two ways: first the single relay
node is the leader of the competition and then the leader
role is assumed by the base station. A non-cooperative
game is formulated in [25], where each relay link is modeled
as a strategic player, who aims at maximizing its own
achievable rate. Canzian, Badia and Zorzi in [26] proposed
a 2-stage Stackelberg game to promote the relay cooper-
ation in wireless networks. A network unit plays the role
of access coordinator that triggers cooperative behaviors,
increasing the access opportunities of users acting as relays.
A repeated cooperative game model (known also as grim-
trigger strategy) has been employed in [27] in order to
improve performance of radio resource allocation in a dual-
hop LTE network. In [28], the cooperation among the
agents in a cooperative network with energy harvesting
powered relays has been modeled as a canonical coalitional
game with core solution concept. It is shown in [28] that
in the large–SNR regime, the grand coalition is stable
and always preferred, which means that users acting in
coalition cannot do worse than acting alone. In [29], a two-
level game has been proposed for joint relay selection and
resource allocation in MIMO-OFDM cooperative cognitive
radio networks. The first level of the game of [29] is a non-
transferable utility coalition graph game, while the Nash
Bargaining approach is the second level. In [30], a hedonic
coalitional game has been proposed to maximize the capac-
ity of a cooperative broadcast network with simultaneous
wireless information and power transfer. In the hedonic
games, players may decide to leave a coalition and to join
another coalition only on the basis of their own specific
preferences, without taking care about how the remaining
players are partitioned. It is worth noting that the hedonic
coalitional game proposed in [30] clearly outperforms the
non-cooperative schemes.
B. Contribution of the paper
Considering the state-of-the-art background analyzed
in the previous subsection, coalitional games can oﬀer
feasible and reliable solutions to the problem of QoS
provisioning in cooperative MIMO networks with unstable
power sources. Approaches based on mere mathematical
optimization and a-priori fixed relaying protocols like
those of [15], [16] [17], [18], and [19] may lack of flexibility
in addressing the QoS fluctuations due to unstable power
supply and/or may be computationally expensive. Non-
cooperative game solutions of [22], [23] [24], [25], and [26],
considering bargaining games or Stackelberg games, are
inspired to centralized and strictly normative concepts
aimed at disciplining the selfish behavior of agents. Such
an approach does not seem the best way to model the
distributed cooperation typical of MIMO-based relaying
with energy harvesting, where agents should harmonize
their behavior in order to exploit at their best the radio
resources and the limited energy reserves. In such a
perspective, results shown in [28] and [30], obtained by
diﬀerent kinds of coalitional games, are very promizing.
However, some key issues should still be solved.
The canonical game with core solution concept
adopted in [28] is very appropriate to model competitive
interactions, introducing a notion of individual and
self-interest. However, canonical coalitional game class
(namely: Class I ) does not take into account some
critical factors in cooperative relaying with energy
harvesting, basically: the network structure that might
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change in diﬀerent transmission epochs, depending on
harvesting and channel conditions, and the cost involved
for cooperation. Moreover, the core may be empty, too
large or the allocation that lies in the core can be unfair
for some players of the game [9] [21]. When the core
is empty, the related solution concept simply does not
exist, revealing the intrinsic instability of the considered
interaction. When the core is too large, the selection of
a suitable core allocation may be diﬃcult and ineﬃcient
[9]. In the last case, some players may be unsatisfied by
the payoﬀ allocation of the core and may have the will
to leave the coalition. The solution proposed in [29] is
interesting from the formal viewpoint, but the proposed
two-level cooperative game is computationally expensive
and requires the relaxing of some constraints in order to
become tractable. The hedonic game solution proposed in
[30] is conceptually attractive, but also computationally
prohibitive. Indeed, as shown in [31], to decide whether a
hedonic game admits a stable core, Nash equilibrium or
an individual stable outcome is a NP-complete problem.
In order to overcome the aforesaid issues, we propose a
coalition formation game with non transferable utility and
Shapley value as solution concept. Diﬀerent from canonical
coalitional games, coalition formation games, known also as
Class II coalitional games, better model the time varying
conditions of power supply and channel propagation.
Unfortunately, the core computation for coalition
formation games not only suﬀers from ineﬃciencies similar
to those noticed in canonical coalitional games, but also,
is generally characterized by prohibitive computational
complexity [9]. On the other hand, the Shapley value,
named in honor of Lloyd Shapley who proposed it in
1953, attributes a unique payoﬀ vector to all the agents
in coalition by means of an axiomatic approach [9].
Shapley value is unique, much easier to be computed
and it emphasizes the fairness of the division of the
value among agents [21]. By virtue of its own properties,
Sv solution concept well meets the requirements of
our cooperative MIMO scenario, characterized by the
necessity of eﬃciently sharing the radio resources (namely:
the OFDM subcarriers) to maximize a global utility (i.e.:
the network capacity), under the constraint of unstable
power supply. From the algorithmic viewpoint, this is
the main innovative contribution of our paper; indeed,
to the best of our knowledge, coalition formation game
with Sv-based solution concept has not yet been applied
either in cooperative networking or in energy harvesting
management.
Another remarkable diﬀerence of the proposed approach
from the state-of-the-art contributions is related to the
dynamic configuration of the MIMO-OFDM network
directly managed by the coalition formation game. Indeed,
the coalition is formed, epoch by epoch, promoting the
cooperation between the base-station and those relays
that can guarantee the best quality-of-service, under the
EH power constraint. The relays in coalition then form
the virtual MIMO network that transmits the information
to the destination. Such a cooperative and dynamic
reconfiguration of the virtual MIMO network structure
has been considered for WSNs (see e.g. [13]), but is not
straightforward in cooperative relaying.
From the viewpoint of mobile communication
techniques, a significant contribution of the present
work concerns with the adoption of a robust MIMO
space-time coding technique, namely the Algebraic Space-
Time Coding (ASTC) [32], [33], in order to improve the
link performance of the cooperative relaying system. The
superiority of ASTC over orthogonal space-time block
coding (OSTBC) has been clearly demonstrated in [33],
in particular for number of transmit antennas higher
than two. To the best of our knowledge, no published
contribution deals with the use of ASTC in cooperative
MIMO-OFDM networks with energy harvesting. The
performance improvement yielded by ASTC will be shown
in Section V.
III. System Model
A. ASTC-MIMO-OFDM transmission for cooperative re-
laying
Let us consider the cooperative communication system
model of Fig. 2. The source node (Base station) is equipped
with nt antennas, while the nr relay nodes have a single
antenna. The transmitted binary message sequence sk
is QAM-modulated. The QAM symbols are then ASTC
encoded. ASTC coding has been proposed in [32]–[34],
which have the structure of full-rate and full diversity 2×2,
3 × 3, 4 × 4, and 6× 6 space-time codes. These codes are
characterized by a constant minimum determinant as the
spectral eﬃciency increases. These features are expected
to be helpful to mitigate the link performance degradation
involved by energy harvesting.
We denote with vk = [s4k−3, s4k−2, s4k−1, s4k]T the
ASTC encoder input at the kth signaling interval and
Ck,G and Ck,T the related encoder output for the Golden
Codes (GC) and Tast Codes (TC) respectively, as shown
in eq. (1) and eq. (2) (see page 5). The ASTC output is
then fed to nt OFDM modulators, each with nc subcarriers
and cyclic prefix (CP) of length ng. We denote the ASTC
codeword sent to the OFDMmodulator with xk ∈ Cncnt×1,
while xn,k is the MIMO codeword transmitted over the nth
subcarrier at the signaling period k. The overall vector of
length nc + ng is transmitted over a frequency-selective
and time-varying MIMO channel. The CP length ng is
assumed to exceed the largest multipath delay spread
in order to remove inter-symbol interference. The kth
MIMO-OFDM symbol uk ∈ Cnt(nc+ng)×1 is then given
by uk = ξ1
√
nc(F−1 ⊗ Int)xk where F−1 is the Cncnc×1
Fourier matrix, whose (n, k)th element is exp (−j2πnk/nc),
⊗ denotes the Kronecker product, Int represents the nt
identity matrix, and ξ1 ∈ Cnt(nc+ng)×ncnt is the CP adding
matrix given by ξ1 =
[(
0 Ing
Inc
)
⊗ Int
]
.
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Figure 2. Cooperative MIMO-OFDM communication system with energy harvesting using coalitional game-based transmission strategy.
Ck,G =
1√
5
(
α (vk[1] + θ vk[2]) α (vk[3] + θ vk[4])
α (vk[3] + θ vk[4]) α (vk[1] + θ vk[2])
)
(1)
where:
θ =
1 +
√
5
2
; θ =
1−√5
2
; α = 1 + i− iθ; α = 1 + i− iθ
Ck,T =
1√
2
(
(vk[1] + θ vk[2]) ϕ (vk[3] + θ vk[4])
ϕ (vk[3]− θ vk[4]) (vk[1]− θ vk[2])
)
(2)
where:
θ = exp(iλ); λ ∈ ℜ; ϕ = θ2
The signal received by the pth receiving antenna during
the kth MIMO-OFDM symbol period is expressed as,
ypk =
nt∑
q=1
L−1∑
l=0
hp,qk (l)u
q
k(k − l) +wpk (3)
where uqk is the symbol vector transmitted by the q
th
antenna and wpk is the zero mean white Gaussian complex
noise of variance N02 . Let us define the equivalent channel
matrix Gk ∈ Cnt(nc+ng)×nt(nc+ng). We can thus express
the received MIMO-OFDM signal yk ∈ Cnr(nc+ng)×1 in
matrix notation as,
yk = Gkuk +wk (4)
where wk ∈ Cnr(nc+ng)×1 represents the AWGN noise
sample. After CP removal, the received signal is converted
to the frequency domain by means of a DFT opera-
tion. The signal at the DFT output is then given by
zk =
1√
nc
[(F ⊗ Intnr)ξ2]yk, where the CP removal matrix
ξ2 = [0ncngIng ] ⊗ Ing discards the first ngnr elements of
yk. Thus, we can reformulate the DFT output signal as
zk =
[
(F ⊗ Intnr )ξ3(F−1 ⊗ Intnr)
]
xk +wk
= Hkxk +wk (5)
where the block circulant matrix ξ3 ∈ Cntnc×nrnc is
defined as ξ3 = ξ2Gkξ1 and wk is the frequency domain
Gaussian noise with zero mean and variance σ2w and Hk
is Cntnc×ncnt frequency domain matrix defined as Hk =[
(F ⊗ Intnr)ξ3(F−1 ⊗ Intnr )
]
.
B. Energy harvesting and power consumption model
Renewable energy is harvested from nature and then
cumulated in a rechargeable battery. The harvested en-
ergy level depends on the occurrence of energy arrivals.
The energy state changes when the renewable energy is
captured. We assume that the arrival rate of harvested
energy is a stochastic process obeying to the Poisson law
and thus parameterized by the Poisson frequency λe [18].
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Between two energy arrivals, the channel state may also
change. We suppose that there are n+1 channels or energy
level modifications times, 0 = t0 < . . . < tn = T over the
entire transmission interval [0, T ]. We define an epoch as
the interval between two consecutive energy level changing
instants whose duration is denoted by Li = ti − ti−1, i =
1, . . . , n, with
∑n
i=1 Li = T . The following set describe the
energy arrival process (am, Hrm, Stm, Usm, Pxm), m =
0, 1, . . . ,M , where M denotes the number of energy ar-
rivals, am denotes the epoch index of themth energy arrival
time, Hrm denotes the amount of arriving (harvested)
energy, Stm denotes the stored power, and Usm is the
power consumed at time tam . The total power transmitted
by the relay at time tam is given by,
Pxm = Hrm + Stm−Usm (6)
On the basis of the comparison of Pxm = Hrm +Stm with
a fixed threshold ξ, the relay will decide to cooperate with
the base station and other relays or to remain in stand-by,
i.e.: {
Pxm = Hrm − Stm + Usm ≥ ξ Tx is On
Pxm = Hrm − Stm + Usm < ξ Tx is Oﬀ
(7)
The choice of ξ depends on the required energy needed
to process the current data. In the threshold-checking
selection, the source chooses the relay with the highest har-
vested energy that is capable to instantiate the real-time
instruction in the current epoch. It is demonstrated that
threshold-checking selection yields to better performance
in terms of achieved capacity, although requiring global
channel knowledge during each transmission epoch.
IV. Coalitional Game for Cooperative
MIMO-OFDM Transmission Systems with EH
A. Coalitional game theory
Generally speaking, coalitional game theory aims at
answering two fundamental questions:
• Which coalition among agents should be formed?
• How should that coalition divide its payoﬀ among its
members?
Three formal entities define a coalitional game [9]:
• The set of all the players in the game, denoted by N ;
• The characteristic function of the game: v : 2N )→ R;
• The coalition structure defined as: S =
{S1, . . . Sn},S ⊆ N .
Cooperative games are subdivided into two main cate-
gories: canonical (Class I) and coalition formation (Class
II) games [9]. In canonical games, the formation of large
coaltions is always advantageous to any of the involved
players. In other words, no group of players will perform
worse by cooperating. This property is called superaddi-
tivity. They key point of canonical game is represented
by the coalition stability, i.e., no formed coalition should
have the convenience to upset the reached agreement.
The objectives of the canonical games are: i) to study
the stability of the grand coalition N , formed by all the
players in the game and ii) to study how the payoﬀ
amount received, v(N ), should be split among the players
(allocation fairness). For this reason, canonical coalitional
games are defined by the couple (N , v) [9].
Coalition formation games are suitable for modeling
real-world situations where network structure and cost of
cooperation play a major role. The coalition formation
game is generally not superadditive. Also in coalition
formation games, forming a coalition brings gains to its
members, but the gains are limited by a cooperation cost
(in canonical games, such a cost is negligible). Therefore,
the main objective of a Class II coalitional game is to study
the coalition structure S, namely: the optimal selection
of the players in coalition, the optimal coalition size, etc.
The presence of a cost for forming coalitions implies that
some negotiation or information exchange is necessary in
order to decide how the coalition is structured. Moreover,
in Class II games, the coalition structure is imposed by a
factor external to the game (physical restriction [9]). As
a result, we have the coalition structure S, which is not
unique, like in the canonical game case. Hence, coalition
formation games are defined by the triplet (N , v,S).
If it exists, the core solution concept C(v) for a coali-
tional game is the set of imputations (x1, x2, . . . , xi, . . . xn)
that satisfies the following condition [9]:
C (v) =
{
x ∈ ℜN :
∑
i∈N
xi = v (N ) ;
∑
i∈S
xi ! v (S)∀S ⊆ N
}
(8)
In other words, the core is the set of imputations where
no coalition S ⊆ N has an incentive to reject the reached
payoﬀ allocation and deviate from the grand coalition. The
existence of the core of coalitional games is not always
guaranteed [9]. In many games, the core is empty and hence
it is not applicable as solution concept. If the core is not
empty, it does not necessarily contain a unique imputations
vector. This implies that competitive forces alone are not
enough to univocally determine agent’s captured value [21]
and that negotiating capabilities also come into the play.
As a consequence, the core generally admits a continuum
of solutions. As stated in [9], if the core is not unique
and becomes too large, it can be very diﬃcult to select
a suitable core allocation. In order to be used as a reliable
prediction tool, the core should also verify the stability
conditions. The core is stable if two conditions are satisfied:
i) no payoﬀ vector is dominated by another vector in the
core (internal stability), ii) all payoﬀ vectors outside the
core are dominated by at least one vector in the core (ex-
ternal stability) [9]. It has been demonstrated in [35] that
if the core is stable, it is also the unique stable imputations
set. But, if the stability property is not verified, the payoﬀ
allocation is unfair for some individual players and they
may want to leave the grand coalition.
In order to overcome the core drawbacks, the literature
[9] [21] suggests to define a diﬀerent solution concept which
can associate to each coalitional game a unique payoﬀ
vector known as the value of the game. Such solution
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concept is known as Shapley value. The Shapley value,
described in the following subsection, oﬀers an eﬃcient
alternative solution to Class I games, avoiding potential
deficiencies of core solution and, as demonstrated in [9], it
represents a feasible and theoretically meaningful solution
also for Class II games, where the use of the core is
hindered by the presence of coalition structure and physical
restriction.
B. Normative approach: the Shapley value
Shapley addressed the problem of finding a possible
solution concept to a coalitional game by means of an
axiomatic approach [9]. Shapley assigns to the game a
unique vector of payoﬀs, called the value. Let us consider a
vectorial function Ψ (•) that associates for each coalitional
game v a payoﬀ vector Ψ(v) ∈ Rn, where Ψi(v) ∈ R is the
prediction payoﬀ of player i in the game v. The Shapley’s
axioms are the following:
1) Symmetry : For any coalitional game v, any permu-
tation π and any player i, Ψi(π(v)) = Ψπ−1(i)(v).
2) Dummy : For any coalitional game v, and any dummy
coalition1, D,
∑
i∈RΨi(v) = v(D).
3) Additivity: For any coalitional game v and w, ∀p ∈
[0, 1] and any player i, Ψi(pv+(1− p)w) = pΨi(v) +
(1− p)Ψi(w).
There is exactly one and only one function Ψ satisfying the
axioms of Shapley:
Ψi(v) =
∑
S⊂N\{i}
|S|!× (|N |− |S|− 1)!
|N |! × (9)
[v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)]
where |S| is the cardinal of set S, k! = 1 × 2 × 3 . . . × k
and 0! = 1. The Shapley value is not generally related
to the core in canonical coalitional games [9]. However, in
some applications, it can be demonstrated that the Shapley
value lies in the core. This is verified, for instance, for
convex games [9]. As far as coalition formation games are
concerned, it has been demonstrated in [9] that the Shapley
value axioms still hold also in presence of physical restric-
tion and coalition structure S. Therefore, Sv-based concept
solution is still applicable to the generated coalition. On
the other hand, the canonical definition of the core in Class
II games is substantially modified by the presence of the
coalition structure and the restriction does not apply to
the core [9]. This is motivated by the fact that the core
depends on all the possible coalitions of N . This implies
that the core depends on the values of the coalitions Sj ∈ S
as well as on the values of the coalitions Sj /∈ S. It is
clear that the problem of finding the core of (N , v,S) is
much more complex than computing the Shapley value, in
particular for non transferable utility games or dynamic
formation games [9]. These motivations, widely discussed
in the literature, lead us to consider the Shapley value as
the most appropriate solution for our problem.
1v(C ∩D) = v(C), if a player is not in D, it is useless.
C. Proof of existence of the Nash equilibrium
Fink in [36] generalised the Shapley value concept to
n players and he proved that, when the Shapley value
solution concept exists, the Nash equilibrium is reached. In
Appendix C, the main steps of the proof are summarized.
D. The proposed Class II coalitional game algorithm
The model of the proposed coalitional game will be
designed on the basis of the system presented in section
III, either for uplink (UL) or downlink (DL) channel. The
proposed scheme will be modeled as a (N , v,S) coalition
formation game with non transferable utility. We believe
that such a theoretical game is the best tool to model the
cooperation of base-station and relays in the presence of
energy harvesting. Indeed, the relay selection to optimize
network capacity depends on the channel and energy har-
vesting status that may change epoch by epoch. Thus,
a dynamic coalition structure, taking into account these
time-varying factors, is strongly envisaged.
The base station of the cell must allocate a subcarrier ni
to each relay before transmission. In terms of coalitional
game theory, each subcarrier ni is identified as a player
in the game. So the grand coalition will be defined as
N = {0, . . . , N = ncnt}, while v is the utility function
resulting from a coalition S, based on the QoS requirement
in terms of data rate Rni , and, finally, Sl = {n1 . . . , nl}
contains a partition of N . We shall consider in our game
the transferable utility assumption for the players of a
formed coalition, so that the payoﬀs attributed to such a
coalition may be freely redistributed among its members.
However, the payoﬀ of a coalition is not transferred to
another coalition successively formed during the game.
Moreover, we assume that v(∅) = 0; this last assumption
is satisfied whenever a universal payoﬀ policy is used in
the game and means that a single payoﬀ value can be
assigned to each coalition. In the following propositions,
we shall demonstrate the existence of the Shapley value
for the proposed coalitional game.
Proposition-1: The proposed game has a non-
transferable utility and the utilities of all members of N
are the same.
Proof-1 :
All the relays belonging to N will lose communication
ability, if there is no harvested power, and the network
configuration will no longer be the same. We design the
utility function v(Sl) based on transmission process in
terms of data rate Rni ; hence the utilities of relays are
as [37], [38],
RSlni = log2
([
1 +
1
σ2wk
ncniP
2
h
])
∀ni ∈ Sl, ∀Sl ∈ N (10)
where Ph denotes the mean power to each channel coeﬃ-
cient in time domain. The coalition value v(Sl) ∈ R|Sl| is
given by:
v(Sl) =
{
RSlni ∈ R | RSlni = log2
([
1 +
1
σ2wk
ncniP
2
h
])}
(11)
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where |Sl| denote the number of relays in Sl. "
Proposition-2: For the proposed game (N , v,S) with the
final coalition Sl = {n1 . . . , nl}, the Shapley axioms are
true and the function Ψ exists.
Proof-2:
The three Shapley’s axioms should be satisfied by the
proposed payoﬀ v(Sl) distribution. The Ψ function in (9)
satisfying the axioms of Shapley should verify the following
properties:
Symmetry: a permutation π is a bijection π : N →
N . Given a permutation π and the presented coalitional
game v, πv is the coalitional game obtained swapping
the indices of the players ni. So for any player ni ∈
Sl, πv(Sl) = v(π−1(Sl)), then we can conclude that
Ψi(π(v)) = Ψπ−1(i)(v).
Dummy: given a player nj ̸∈ C, where C is dummy
coalition, So v(D ∩ C) = v(D)={Rni}∀i̸=j,(i,j)∈R2 , which
is equal to
∑
i∈RΨi(v).
Additivity: for any player ni and p ∈ [0, 1], let us consider
two coalitional games v1 and v2. We have Ψi(pv1) =
K1
∑i
z=1 pv
i
1, where K1 =
∑
S⊂N\{i}
|S|!×(|N |−|S|−1)!
|N |! is
an integer constant representing the residual set after
adding the player i. Ψi((1 − p)v2) = K1∑iz=1(1 − p)vi2,
hence Ψi(pv1)+Ψi((1−p)v2) = K1(∑iz=1 pvi1+∑iz=1(1−
p)vi2) = Ψi(pv1 + (1− p)v2). "
By now, we are sure about the existence of the Shapley
value that can be derived as explained in the following
paragraph.
Ψ function derivation: Eq.(9) for the Shapley value can
be rewritten by noting that the term inside the summation
is a beta function,
|S|!× (|N |− |S|− 1)!
|N |! = β(nl + 1, ncnt − nl) (12)
=
∫ 1
0
xnl(1− x)ncnt−nl−1dx
Thus, the Shapley value can be evaluated by integrating
xnl(1 − x)ncnt−nl−1; this requires to evaluate a function
whose size doubles every time a new player is added.
Obviously, this method has exponential complexity. In
order to overcome this problem, we should approximate
the integrand in some reliable manner. Assuming that each
player ni cooperates with probability x, independently of
other players, a random variable vxi is defined that counts
the number of cooperative players in the game. In large
games with many small weights, vxi will be almost normally
distributed for the central limit theorem, and the desired
probability xnl(1 − x)ncnt−nl−1 = Pr[ξ − wi ≤ vxi ≤ ξ]
can be approximately computed by using the Gaussian
distribution function. In the aforesaid expression, wi ∈ R+
stands for the weight of the player ni. Such a weight is
equal to one if the player has enough harvested power level
ξ, i.e.,
wi =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 P ixm ≥ ξ
0 otherwise,
(13)
where w(Sl) =
∑l
i=1 wi ≥ ξ´.
We assume that the channel response remains approx-
imately constant over one ASTC-MIMO-OFDM symbol
block. The channel impulse response between the qth trans-
mitting antenna and pth receiving antenna is modeled as a
finite-length tapped delay line hp,qk =
∑L−1
l=0 h
p,q
k (l)δ(k− l),
where hp,qk (l) is the channel gain related to the l
th path
from the qth transmit antenna to the pth receive antenna
at signaling time k. If Rayleigh fading is considered, the
channel tap sequence {hp,qk (l)} is a complex random Gaus-
sian process with zero mean. Then, we can approximate
the total power required by the relay as Pxm = E
(
P 2h
)
=
E{hp,qk (l)
[
hm,nk−k′ (l
′)
]∗}. Substituting (12) in (9) gives,
Ψi(v) =
nl∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
xnl(1 − x)ncnt−nl−1dx× (14)
log2
([
1 +
1
σ2wk
ncwiP
2
h
])
=
∫ 1
0
nl∑
i=1
xnl(1 − x)ncnt−nl−1dx×
log2
([
1 +
1
σ2wk
ncwiP
2
h
])
≈
∫ 1
0
(
N(
ξ´ − m¯xi
v¯xi
)−N( ξ´ − m¯
x
i − wi
v¯xi
)
)
dξ´ ×
log2
([
1 +
1
σ2wk
ncwiP
2
h
])
≈ log2
([
1 +
1
σ2wk
ncwiP
2
h
])
wi(1− 2m¯xi )√
π(v¯xi )
2
where v¯xi and m¯
x
i stand for the variance and the mean v
x
i
respectively (see Appendix A for additional details).
E. Game formulation
According to the considered game model, we propose a
coalition formation algorithm to implement the coopera-
tive transmission scheme. We assume that each round lasts
long enough to enable the coalition formation process and
the relays have suﬃcient processing capabilities to support
the game. We suppose also by default that all relays belong
to the grand coalition N .
Remark 1: Under the quasi-static assumption made
about the channel, since the relay and the base station are
fixed and located in the same cell, it is possible to consider
the channel matrix Hk as a constant diagonal matrix.
The proposed cooperative game-based approach, here-
inafter named: Coalitional ASTC-MIMO-OFDM (CAMO)
algorithm, is articulated in three phases, described as
follows,
1) Phase I: Power negotiation
During Phase I, the proposed algorithm initializes the
network on the basis of the power level harvested
by each relay Pxm
n
i . The base station will ask to
all the relays present in the grand coalition N if
they have enough harvested power. This is obtained
by broadcasting a specific message to the nr relays,
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using ASTC-MIMO-OFDM transmission. If the relay
satisfies the threshold condition Pxm ≥ ξ, it must
imperatively send an ACK message to the base sta-
tion. In fact, the ACK is used just to inform the
base station about the current power level measured
at each relay. This transmission is processed on the
basis of the actual harvested power level. In the
case of no information received from one or more
relays, the exclusion of such relays from the game
is automatically issued. Otherwise, the base station
still considers these relay(s) as player(s).
2) Phase II: Coalition formation
By sending the ACK, the relay can maintain its
position in the grand coalition N , showing its ability
to be part of the final coalition Sl. Consequently,
the base station will allocate the subcarriers ni to
that relay which has enough available power. For any
relay, which does not satisfy the threshold condition,
its subcarrier ni will be excluded from the grand
coalition N and the grand coalition N will be up-
dated as N ← N \ {ni} until the formation of the
stable coalition Sl.
3) Phase III: Dynamically-Configured (DC) virtual
ASTC-MIMO-OFDM transmission
During this phase, each relay, whose allocated sub-
carriers are in the final coalition, will form a virtual
network with the other relays in coalition and per-
form an ASTC-MIMO-OFDM data transmission to
l mobile terminals, each one provided with a single
receive antenna.
During phase III, the relays, which cooperate with
the base-station, are not a-priori known. At each
epoch i of the transmission process, the set of selected
relays may change, so the spatial repartition of the
transmitting relays (and their related antennas) will
no longer be the same. Under these conditions, we
are not dealing anymore with a conventional MIMO-
OFDM transmission, where TX/RX antennas are
fixed and a-priori known. In our case, the MIMO
network configuration can change epoch after epoch
depending on the new updated set (relays/users)
generated by the coalitional game algorithm on the
basis of the time-varying channel conditions and the
amount of harvested energy. For this reason, we are
speaking about a dynamically-configured (DC) vir-
tual ASTC-MIMO-OFDM transmission. Indeed, the
MIMO system is virtual, being formed by the selected
cooperating single-antenna relays and dynamically
configured, because the coalition can change during
Phase II and the utility of the game is not transfer-
able to the new formed coalition.
The bit-rate oﬀered by the dynamically-configured
virtual MIMO network (Roffered) – resulting from
the Sv-based coalitional payoﬀ allocation – is then
compared with the bit-rate required to ensure the
expected QoS (Rdemanded). If Roffered ≥ Rdemanded,
the ASTC codeword is transmitted in OFDM
Time
Coalitional game
Base
Station
EH
Rel. n
EH
Rel. j
EH
Rel. 1
Epoch i
Dest.
EH
Rel. n
EH
Rel. j
EH
Rel. 1
Epoch j
Dest.
ACK
EN
ACK
ACK
ACK
EN
Figure 3. Dynamically Configured (DC) virtual ASTC-MIMO-
OFDM transmission: pictorial concept description
modality. If the channel conditions change so that
Roffered < Rdemanded, the game goes back to Phase I
and restarts with the power negotiation and the relay
selection, issuing a new virtual MIMO configuration.
In Fig. 3, the concept of virtual DC ASTC-MIMO-
OFDM transmission is pictorially described, showing
the dynamic reconfiguration of the virtual MIMO
system epoch by epoch. The relay nodes colored in
grey are those excluded by the coalition during the
Phase II. The EN signal sent to the selected relays
indicates that such relays correctly sent the ACK and
are then enabled to cooperate with the base station
in order to transmit information by means of the
established MIMO-OFDM link.
The CAMO algorithm can be summarized at a glance
by the flow diagram shown in Algorithm 1.
V. Simulation Results and Analysis
A. Performance evaluation methodology
This section will show simulation (Sim) and theoretical
(Theore) results in order to assess the performance of
the proposed coalitional game algorithm for cooperative
energy-harvested relay networks. Results will be shown for
the CAMO algorithm, considering the ASTC MIMO cod-
ing, and for CMO (Coalitional MIMO-OFDM) algorithm,
not using the ASTC.
We consider a MIMO-OFDM transmission system whose
parameters, taken by LTE Release 8, are listed in Table I.
We evaluate the performance of the proposed CAMO and
CMO algorithms by means of intensive MATLAB simula-
tions. A frequency selective Rayleigh channel is considered
during the overall algorithmic phases. To obtain all the
numerical results shown in the following of this section,
100000 independent realizations were simulated. Ideal CSI
knowledge has been supposed in all our performance eval-
uation trials.
In order to showcase the robustness of the proposed
coalitional game-based algorithm, we introduce in this
section the goodput (GP) of the MIMO-OFDM system as
reliable performance indicator. When data is transferred
over air interfaces, the average transfer speed is often
described as throughput. This metric includes all the over-
head information, such as packet headers and other data
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Algorithm 1 The proposed Coalitional ASTC-MIMO-
OFDM (CAMO) algorithm.
Require: N = ncnt, xl = 0, z = 0, Pxm = 0, Roffered =
0
Phase I: Power negotiation
1: for n = 0 to nr do
2: Pxnm ← Hrmn − Stmn + Usmn
3: if (Pxnm > ξ) then
4: v ← [v, n]
5: end if
6: end for
Phase II: Coalition formation
7: (Sl, xl)← (v, length{Sl}) Set update
8: (nt, nr)← (xl, nt)
9: for n = 0 to xl do
10: Ackn ← [(F ⊗ Intnr )ξ3(F−1 ⊗ Intnr )]xk + wk Re-
lays UL Acknowledgement Signal
11: end for
Phase III: Virtual ASTC-MIMO-OFDM transmission
12: xl ← nl + 1
13: for n = 0 to xl do
14: Ψn ← log2
([
1 +
1
σ2wk
ncnP 2h
])
(1−2m¯xn)√
π(v¯xn)
2
15: Roffered ← Ψn +Roffered Evaluate the oﬀered rate
16: end for
17: Compare(Roffered, Rdemanded)
18: if Roffered ≥ Rdemanded then
19: Transmission
20: else
21: Goto Phase I
22: end if
Table I
LTE Rel.8 Downlink Simulation Parameters
System Parameter Parameter Value
Modulation 16-QAM
Bandwidth 20 MHz
Number of subcarriers nc = 128
Cyclic prefix length ng =
nc
4 = 32
Subcarrier spacing 15 kHz
that are included in the transfer process. It also includes
data that are retransmitted because of network conflicts
or errors. Goodput only measures the throughput of the
useful data and can be calculated by dividing the size of a
transmitted packet by the time it takes to be transferred.
We adopt in this paper the normalized goodput (GP)
metric as defined in [39],
GP = GPmax(1−BER) (15)
where the maximum normalized goodput, GPmax, corre-
sponds to the number of data bits sent per subcarrier. For
a MIMO-OFDM system with nc subcarriers, cyclic prefix
of ng symbols and 8 CRC bits inserted every 120 data bits,
the maximum normalized goodput is given by:
GPmax =
120
128
× nc
nc + ng
× log2 (M) (16)
where M is the number of symbols of the chosen digital
modulation constellation.
B. Numerical results
Some preliminary results in terms of bit-error-rate are
shown in Fig.4. More precisely, this figure compares the
BER performance measured during the three phases (I, II
and III) of the proposed cooperative game-based algorithm
with and without ASTC, in order to analyze its behavior in
the diﬀerent algorithmic stages. Results look satisfactory
mainly when ASTC codes are applied. We can note that,
for high and low SNRs, the end-to-end transmission of
phase III outperforms in terms of BER phase I and phase
II. ASTC coding thus provides better link performance
and can significantly contribute to improve the system
capacity. In Fig.5, we compare the capacity reached by
the proposed MIMO-OFDM system, when the relay energy
is harvested and cooperation among the network nodes is
enabled and when the energy that empowers the relays is
stable and no cooperation is exploited. For sake of clarity
and visualization, only the theoretical capacity curve of
CMO system has been plotted for the stable energy case.
We can note that the capacity oﬀered by the MIMO-
OFDM system with stable power supply is only slightly
superior to that attained by the same system operating
with energy harvesting and cooperation. Moreover, the
diﬀerence between the simulated capacity results and the
corresponding ones computed by means of the analytic
equation (14) is not significant. Again, ASTC coding pro-
vides an improvement with respect to the uncoded CMO
case when energy harvesting is involved. It is clear that
the results shown in Fig.5 can provide a first, important,
validation to our approach.
Fig. 6 shows the normalized goodput performance vs.
average link SNR, when our coalitional cooperative game
is applied and when the transmission system works with
stable energy (in such a case the power level has been
fixed to 70 dBmW). For SNR > 10dB, the diﬀerence
between the goodput values reached with or without energy
harvesting/cooperation and with 4 or 5 active relays is
small. At lower SNRs the goodput loss due to the increased
packet error rate mainly occurs when the cooperation
between relays increases from 4 to 5 nodes. In any case,
fixing the number of active relays, the goodput curves
related to stable and harvested energy are very close. This
is another evidence of the eﬀectiveness of the proposed
theoretical game-based cooperation strategy.
Fig. 7 compare the theoretical goodput with the sim-
ulated one for the proposed CAMO algorithm and that
achieved by the coalitional game-based transmission strat-
egy for energy harvesting networks presented in [28], which
considers canonical Class I game with core solution con-
cept. The coalition is formed by two pairs relays for both
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the evaluated algorithms. The theoretical goodput has
been derived by substituting the simulated BER used in
Eq. (15) by the theoretical BER Pe computed in [40],
Pe ≤
(
1 +
σ2s
4σ2n
nt +
Ni∑
i=1
λi + (
σ2s
4σ2n
)NiNt
(
Ni∏
i=1
λi
)nt)−1
(17)
where λi is the ith eigenvalue of the covariance matrix
Qy of the received vector y. It can be seen from Fig.7
that for high SNR, say SNR > 15dB, the goodput of the
proposed CAMO method is higher than that of the method
reported in [28]. For example, at SNR = 30dB the gain
is 5.3% and at 40dB the gain becomes larger and reaches
12%. However, for low SNR, say SNR < 15dB, the method
of [28] performs better. For example, at SNR = 10dB, the
canonical game of [28] achieves a 6.6% goodput gain with
respect to the coalition formation game proposed in this
paper. Such a behavior can be explained if we consider the
two diﬀerent theoretical game-based strategies adopted. In
our approach, the virtual ASTC-MIMO-OFDM network
is dynamically configured by the relays in coalition and
the coalition is formed after the negotiation phase. As a
result, some relays, along with their subcarriers, may be
excluded from the coalition. On the contrary, the Class
I game of [28] does not consider any negotiation. The
grand coalition is formed by all the relays of the virtual
network, independently of their amount of harvested power
and their channel status, aiming to seek for a stable core
solution concept that is convenient for all the players in the
game. At low SNR, the Class I game looks more eﬀective,
because system performance is largely constrained by the
noise and, therefore, the global sum-rate provided by the
larger coalition may become higher. On the other hand,
during the negotiation phase, the proposed Class II game
may incur misdetection of control packets that contain base
station interrogation and/or ACK relay replies, due to the
high BER at low SNR. This causes some undue exclusions
of players that could actively contribute to increasing the
overall system capacity. When SNR increases, the negotia-
tion phase is much less impaired by the control messaging
failures and the Class II algorithm dynamically selects,
as expected, the players in coalition on the basis of their
harvested power amount and their channel conditions. In
such a framework, the Sv-based solution concept provides
a payoﬀ allocation to the diﬀerent players, which is adap-
tive to external network conditions, and thus outperforms
the core solution concept of [28]. Indeed, the canonical
game of [28] does not consider any change of coalition
structure depending on time-varying external factors. The
computation of the stable core solution concept, which
is capable of guaranteeing fairness to all the individual
players in the grand coalition, may, therefore, be hindered
by unfavourable changes of channel and/or energy har-
vesting status that aﬀect one or more players. For the
sake of completeness, it should also be noticed that the
theoretical and simulated goodput curves attained by the
Class I game of [28] tend to approach the corresponding
ones of the proposed Class II game for SNR ≥ 45dB. This
is due to the augmented stability of the grand coalition
and the core solution concept, which has been proven in
[28] to be asymptotically reached for SNR → +∞. It is
worth of highlighting in this series of numerical evaluations
the perfect agreement between simulation and theoretical
results. This fact can further demonstrate the correctness
of our analysis.
In order to highlight the influence on the system per-
formance of harvesting random characterization, Fig. 8
shows the curves of capacity vs. Poisson frequency of
the energy harvesting arrivals λe, comparing the proposed
coalitional game approach with the work of Wang et al
[18] that is aimed at finding low-complexity near-optimal
transmission policies for MIMO broadcast channels. As
for Fig.7, CAMO algorithm is implemented for a coalition
formed by two pairs relays. It can be seen that CAMO
algorithm outperforms the approach proposed in [18] for
the overall considered λe range. In such a comparison,
CAMO demonstrated its superiority in updating in real-
time relay configuration and network parameters, as soon
as new arrivals of energy available for harvesting occur.
As far as capacity performance vs. harvested power is
concerned, in Fig.9, we compare the capacity achieved by
the proposed coalitional game strategy with that obtained
by the analytical closed-form solution to RRM relay op-
timization of Yang, Zhou and Xiao [19]. From the curves
plotted in Fig.9, we can note a dramatic harvested power
gain. For a capacity of 4.5 bits/s/Hz, such a gain is around
50 dB.
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Figure 4. BER performance vs. Eb/N0 achieved during the diﬀerent
algorithmic phases by the proposed CAMO (blue line) and CMO
(black line) coalitional game-based algorithms.
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and CMO (black line) coalitional game-based algorithms, obtained
by Eq. (14) for simulated and theoretical curves: comparison with
the stable energy system (no EH).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 120.4
0.45
0.5
0.55
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
5 Relays with EH
4 Relays with EH
5 Relays with stable energy
4 Relays with stable energy
Figure 6. Goodput performance vs. link SNR of CAMO algorithm
with diﬀerent numbers of active relays: comparison with the stable
energy system (fixed power: 70 dBmW).
C. Complexity analysis
In this subsection, we compare the complexity of the
proposed algorithm to those of the methodologies used for
comparison in Fig.7 and 8 (see ref. [18], [28]) and, for
sake of completeness, those published in related works:
[27] and [29]. From Table II, it can be observed that
the order of computational complexity of the proposed
algorithm is reduced at least by nc times with respect to
the corresponding order of the algorithm shown in [27],
and by nt times and n2c times respectively as compared to
those of [28] [29]. Detailed proof is given in Appendix B.
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[28] - Theore
CAMO-Sim
CAMO-Theore
Figure 7. Goodput performance of CAMO algorithm vs. link SNR
compared with the canonical coalitional game-based approach of Ding
and Poor [28].
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Figure 8. Achievable capacity of CAMO algorithm vs. Poisson fre-
quency of EH arrivals λe, compared to that obtained by the approach
proposed by Wang et.al. [18].
This saving of computational resources becomes significant
for large nc and nt and further on proves the eﬀectiveness
of our coalitional cooperative communication method.
For what concerns the approach shown in [18], the
computational burden could be lighter than that of our
algorithm and depends on how much time we need to go
through the A energy arrivals at relay antenna to identify
all the power-changing points.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper, we have proposed a Class II coalitional
game-based methodology for cooperative communications
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Figure 9. Achievable capacity of CAMO algorithm vs. harvested
power, compared to that obtained by Yang’s et.al. [19] analytical
approach.
Table II
Complexity Analysis
Methods Complexity
[18] O (A)
[27] O
(
n4cn
4
t + n
3
t
)
[28] O
(
n3cn
3
t + 3n
2
cn
2
t
)
[29] O
(
n5cn
4
t + n
2
t
)
This Work O
(
n3cn
2
t + ncn
2
l
)
using MIMO-OFDM transmission in a multi-user context
with energy harvesting at relay nodes. To maximize the
system capacity, we have formulated a non-transferable
utility coalition formation game with Shapley value so-
lution concept, in which the players are the EH-powered
relay nodes – along with their subcarrier sets – that may
cooperate or not with the base-station on the basis of their
amount of harvested energy and of the channel conditions.
At each transmission epoch, the selected relays in coalition
form a dynamically-configured virtual MIMO network that
transmits information to destination using robust Alge-
braic Space-Time Coding (ASTC). The performance of the
proposed approach has been evaluated for diﬀerent MIMO
scenarios – employing or not ASTC – and compared both
with the empirical bounds and with other three recent
related works, namely: [18], [19], and [28]. Simulation
results demonstrate that the proposed Sv-based coalition
formation game can approach the empirical bounds very
closely and outperforms the other considered state-of-the-
art techniques, with an aﬀordable computational burden,
generally reduced as compared with that of counterpart
methodologies.
Future research work may consider the use of the pro-
posed approach in a massive MIMO context. By increasing
the number of antennas, the energy harvested from the
massive MIMO system could decrease the on-oﬀ status of
each transmit antenna. This could substantially change the
boundary system conditions and will have a significant im-
pact on the overall coalitional game strategy formulation.
Appendix A
Payoff Derivation
Let us start from the following equation:
Ψi(v) =
nl∑
i=1
∫ 1
0
xnl(1 − x)ncnt−nl−1dx× (18)
log2
([
1 +
1
σ2wk
ncwiP
2
h
])
(19)
≈
∫ 1
0
(
N(
ξ´ − m¯xi
v¯xi
)−N( ξ´ − m¯
x
i − wi
v¯xi
)
)
dξ´ × (20)
log2
([
1 +
1
σ2wk
ncwiP
2
h
])
(21)
We suppose that the total weight satisfies the following
condition: ξ´ ≤ v¯xi + m¯xi + wi2 . Then we can use Taylor
series of the exponential function to the second order as:
exp(x) ≈ 1 + x+O(2) when x→ 0 (22)
With K = wiv¯x
i
, we derive:
∫ 1
0
(
N(
ξ´ − m¯xi
v¯xi
)−N( ξ´ − m¯
x
i − wi
v¯xi
)
)
dξ´ ≈ (23)
2√
(π)
∫ 1
0
[
K − 2K ξ´ − m¯
x
i
v¯xi
]
dξ´ ≈ (24)
2√
(π)
[
K ξ´ − 2K
v¯xi
(
ξ´2
2
− m¯xi ξ´)
]1
0
≈
wi(1 − 2m¯xi )√
π(v¯xi )
2
(25)
Finally, substituting Eq. (23) into Eq. (18) yields Eq. (14).
Appendix B
Complexity Proof
Let a coalitional game G = (V,E) be with V =
v1, . . . , vn and k be the threshold. We construct a set
of agents Ag = a1, . . . , an and a set of resources R =
r1, . . . , rn. For each agent ai, we set Gi = gi. Each goal
gi demands resource, such that:
G(gi, rj) =
{
0 if i ̸= j
k − 1 otherwise
(26)
For each pair (vi, vj) ∈ E the construction of the coalitional
game G can be completed in O(|V |2 × |E|) steps. So the
main phase for Algorithm 1 is in Phase II during coalition
formation. This leads to O(ln2), but the complexity of the
UL ACK transmission will be dominated by O(4(n3cn
2
l ) +
ncn2l ). "
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Appendix C
Proof of Existence of Nash Equilibrium for
Coalitional Games Admitting Shapley Value as
Solution Concept
Let us suppose to have a payoﬀ giλ(ω, x) for the benefit of
the strategy x = (xi)i∈N . Fink started to prove the unicity
of the payoﬀ as in the following proposition:
Proposition–1 : giλ(ω, x) is the unique solution for the
linear system Ω-equations:
giλ(ω, x) =
∑
a∈A(w)
(∏
i∈N
xi(ai)
)
(
λgi(ω, a)
(1 − λ)Σ′ω ∈ Ωq(ω, a)(ω′)gi(ω′, x)
)
(27)
Fink made the hypothesis that the Shapley value exists
for a generic coalitional game. The existence of Shapley
value necessarily implies that Proposition 1 is true. The
verification of Proposition 1 then leads to prove the con-
tinuity of (λ, x) )→ giλ(ω, x) function, as stated in the
following proposition:
Proposition–2 : For any player i and any initial status ω,
the function (λ, x) )→ giλ(ω, x) is continuous and fractional
with λ.
At this step Fink used in [36] the continuity to prove the
stationarity of the game, for which the existence of the
Shapley value has been supposed. This allowed him to
conclude the existence of the Nash equilibrium by invoking
the following theorem:
Theorem (Fink (1964), Takahashi (1965)): Any finite,
discounted stochastic game with N players admits an
equilibrium in stationary strategies.
The last theorem leads straightforwardly to the proof of
the existence of the Nash equilibrium. "
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